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*/ |
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package java.lang; |
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import java.security.*; |
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import java.util.Enumeration; |
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import java.util.Hashtable; |
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import java.util.StringTokenizer; |
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/** |
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* This class is for runtime permissions. A RuntimePermission |
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* contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but |
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* no actions list; you either have the named permission |
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* or you don't. |
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* |
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* <P> |
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* The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The |
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* naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. |
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* Also, an asterisk |
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* may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to |
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* signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*" and "*" signify a |
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* wildcard match, while "*loadLibrary" and "a*b" do not. |
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* <P> |
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* The following table lists all the possible RuntimePermission target names, |
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* and for each provides a description of what the permission allows |
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* and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission. |
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* |
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* <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="permission target name, |
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* what the target allows,and associated risks"> |
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* <tr> |
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* <th>Permission Target Name</th> |
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* <th>What the Permission Allows</th> |
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* <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>createClassLoader</td> |
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* <td>Creation of a class loader</td> |
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* <td>This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant. |
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* Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class |
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* loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system. |
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* These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection |
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* domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the |
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* classes the permissions for that domain.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>getClassLoader</td> |
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* <td>Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling |
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* class)</td> |
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* <td>This would grant an attacker permission to get the |
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* class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because |
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* having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to |
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* load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker |
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* would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>setContextClassLoader</td> |
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* <td>Setting of the context class loader used by a thread</td> |
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* <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions |
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* when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system |
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* class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow |
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* code to change which context class loader is used |
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* for a particular thread, including system threads.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>enableContextClassLoaderOverride</td> |
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* <td>Subclass implementation of the thread context class loader methods</td> |
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* <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions |
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* when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system |
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* class loader. Granting enableContextClassLoaderOverride permission would allow |
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* a subclass of Thread to override the methods that are used |
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* to get or set the context class loader for a particular thread.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>closeClassLoader</td> |
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* <td>Closing of a ClassLoader</td> |
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* <td>Granting this permission allows code to close any URLClassLoader |
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* that it has a reference to.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>setSecurityManager</td> |
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* <td>Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one) |
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* </td> |
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* <td>The security manager is a class that allows |
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* applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager |
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* permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by |
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* installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager, |
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* thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original |
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* security manager.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>createSecurityManager</td> |
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* <td>Creation of a new security manager</td> |
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* <td>This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may |
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* disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>getenv.{variable name}</td> |
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* <td>Reading of the value of the specified environment variable</td> |
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* <td>This would allow code to read the value, or determine the |
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* existence, of a particular environment variable. This is |
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* dangerous if the variable contains confidential data.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>exitVM.{exit status}</td> |
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* <td>Halting of the Java Virtual Machine with the specified exit status</td> |
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* <td>This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack |
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* by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt. |
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* Note: The "exitVM.*" permission is automatically granted to all code |
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* loaded from the application class path, thus enabling applications |
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* to terminate themselves. Also, the "exitVM" permission is equivalent to |
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* "exitVM.*".</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>shutdownHooks</td> |
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* <td>Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks</td> |
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* <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown |
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* hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>setFactory</td> |
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* <td>Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket, |
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* or of the stream handler factory used by URL</td> |
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* <td>This allows code to set the actual implementation |
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* for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory. |
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* An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data |
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* stream.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>setIO</td> |
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* <td>Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err</td> |
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* <td>This allows changing the value of the standard system streams. |
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* An attacker may change System.in to monitor and |
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* steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputStream, |
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* which would hide any error messages sent to System.err. </td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>modifyThread</td> |
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* <td>Modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread |
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* <tt>interrupt</tt>, <tt>stop</tt>, <tt>suspend</tt>, |
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* <tt>resume</tt>, <tt>setDaemon</tt>, <tt>setPriority</tt>, |
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* <tt>setName</tt> and <tt>setUncaughtExceptionHandler</tt> |
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* methods</td> |
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* <td>This allows an attacker to modify the behaviour of |
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* any thread in the system.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>stopThread</td> |
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* <td>Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread <code>stop</code> |
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* method</td> |
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* <td>This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is |
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* already granted permission to access that thread. |
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* This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by |
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* killing existing threads.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>modifyThreadGroup</td> |
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* <td>modification of thread groups, e.g., via calls to ThreadGroup |
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* <code>destroy</code>, <code>getParent</code>, <code>resume</code>, |
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* <code>setDaemon</code>, <code>setMaxPriority</code>, <code>stop</code>, |
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* and <code>suspend</code> methods</td> |
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* <td>This allows an attacker to create thread groups and |
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* set their run priority.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>getProtectionDomain</td> |
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* <td>Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class</td> |
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* <td>This allows code to obtain policy information |
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* for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information |
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* does not compromise the security of the system, it does give |
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* attackers additional information, such as local file names for |
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* example, to better aim an attack.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>getFileSystemAttributes</td> |
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* <td>Retrieval of file system attributes</td> |
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* <td>This allows code to obtain file system information such as disk usage |
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* or disk space available to the caller. This is potentially dangerous |
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* because it discloses information about the system hardware |
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* configuration and some information about the caller's privilege to |
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* write files.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>readFileDescriptor</td> |
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* <td>Reading of file descriptors</td> |
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* <td>This would allow code to read the particular file associated |
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* with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file |
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* contains confidential data.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>writeFileDescriptor</td> |
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* <td>Writing to file descriptors</td> |
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* <td>This allows code to write to a particular file associated |
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* with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow |
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* malicious code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up |
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* your entire disk.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>loadLibrary.{library name}</td> |
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* <td>Dynamic linking of the specified library</td> |
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* <td>It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code |
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* libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and |
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* does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>accessClassInPackage.{package name}</td> |
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* <td>Access to the specified package via a class loader's |
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* <code>loadClass</code> method when that class loader calls |
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* the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageAccess</code> method</td> |
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* <td>This gives code access to classes in packages |
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* to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code |
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* may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise |
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* security in the system.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>defineClassInPackage.{package name}</td> |
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* <td>Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class |
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* loader's <code>defineClass</code> method when that class loader calls |
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* the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageDefinition</code> method.</td> |
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* <td>This grants code permission to define a class |
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* in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious |
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* code with this permission may define rogue classes in |
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* trusted packages like <code>java.security</code> or <code>java.lang</code>, |
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* for example.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>accessDeclaredMembers</td> |
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* <td>Access to the declared members of a class</td> |
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* <td>This grants code permission to query a class for its public, |
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* protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or |
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* methods. Although the code would have |
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* access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not |
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* have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able |
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* to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code |
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* may use this information to better aim an attack. |
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* Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields |
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* in the class. This could be dangerous if |
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* the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or |
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* access the fields because |
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* it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods |
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* and fields. |
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</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>queuePrintJob</td> |
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* <td>Initiation of a print job request</td> |
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* <td>This could print sensitive information to a printer, |
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* or simply waste paper.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>getStackTrace</td> |
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* <td>Retrieval of the stack trace information of another thread.</td> |
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* <td>This allows retrieval of the stack trace information of |
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* another thread. This might allow malicious code to monitor the |
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* execution of threads and discover vulnerabilities in applications.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler</td> |
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* <td>Setting the default handler to be used when a thread |
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* terminates abruptly due to an uncaught exception</td> |
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* <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious |
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* uncaught exception handler that could interfere with termination |
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* of a thread</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>preferences</td> |
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* <td>Represents the permission required to get access to the |
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* java.util.prefs.Preferences implementations user or system root |
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* which in turn allows retrieval or update operations within the |
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* Preferences persistent backing store.) </td> |
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* <td>This permission allows the user to read from or write to the |
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* preferences backing store if the user running the code has |
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* sufficient OS privileges to read/write to that backing store. |
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* The actual backing store may reside within a traditional filesystem |
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* directory or within a registry depending on the platform OS</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* |
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* <tr> |
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* <td>usePolicy</td> |
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* <td>Granting this permission disables the Java Plug-In's default |
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* security prompting behavior.</td> |
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* <td>For more information, refer to Java Plug-In's guides, <a href= |
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* "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/security.html"> |
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* Applet Security Basics</a> and <a href= |
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* "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/rsa_how.html#use"> |
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* usePolicy Permission</a>.</td> |
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* </tr> |
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* </table> |
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* |
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* @see java.security.BasicPermission |
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* @see java.security.Permission |
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* @see java.security.Permissions |
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* @see java.security.PermissionCollection |
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* @see java.lang.SecurityManager |
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* |
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* |
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* @author Marianne Mueller |
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* @author Roland Schemers |
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*/ |
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public final class RuntimePermission extends BasicPermission { |
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private static final long serialVersionUID = 7399184964622342223L; |
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/** |
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* Creates a new RuntimePermission with the specified name. |
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* The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, such as |
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* "exit", "setFactory", etc. An asterisk |
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* may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to |
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* signify a wildcard match. |
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* |
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* @param name the name of the RuntimePermission. |
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* |
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* @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>. |
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* @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty. |
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*/ |
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public RuntimePermission(String name) |
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{ |
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super(name); |
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} |
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/** |
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* Creates a new RuntimePermission object with the specified name. |
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* The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, and the |
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* actions String is currently unused and should be null. |
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* |
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* @param name the name of the RuntimePermission. |
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* @param actions should be null. |
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* |
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* @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>. |
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* @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty. |
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*/ |
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public RuntimePermission(String name, String actions) |
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{ |
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super(name, actions); |
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} |
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} |